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Chinese Companies as "Takers" 
and "Makers" 
ocial Responsibility 
Constantin Holzer 
THE AWAKENING OF CHINA'S 
SUSTAINABILITY DISCOURSE 
The concepts of sustainable development and CSR (Corporate Social 
Responsibility) have gained strongly in popularity with the Chinese govern-
ment during the last decade. Since the beginning of the 11th five-year plan 
(2006-2010) under the leadership of president Hu Jintao and premier Wen 
Jiabao, it became clear to the CCP (Chinese Communist Party) that a vision 
of economic development which favors economic growth at all costs, such as 
during the Jiang Zemin era ( 1993-2003), is not for the benefit of the country 
in the long run. The social and environmental externalities of what is some-
times referred to as three decades of "breakneck economic growth" have not 
just evolved into a serious threat to human health but have also become a 
challenge to the economic and political stability of the country. 
The promulgation of the concepts "Outlook on Scientific Development" 
(kexue fazhan guan), "Harmonious Society" (hexie shehui) and "Ecological 
Civilization" (shengtai wenming) marks a process of ideological transition 
that seeks to strike a balance between the concurring goals of economic 
growth, social equity and a cleaner environment. But this signaled not only a 
break with the more growth-centered era of Jiang Zemin and Li Peng, but also 
marks a step of bold yet inevitable political reform, considering that since the 
Tiananmen incident in 1989 and President Deng Xiao Ping's southern tours 
in 1992, the CCP' s legitimacy to rule the country has been based mainly on 
its ability to create economic growth. 
The socio-ecological corrective imperative of the Hu and Wen era was a 
turn into the right direction but it was just the very beginning. In the meantime, 
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pollution in China is still on the rise. After an initial dent in economic growth 
during the subprime crisis in the United States and in Europe, the situation 
worsened after 2008 when the Chinese government issued a centrally funded 
rescue package of 4 trillion RMB, aggravating the already persisting over-
production in several key industries, among them steel, chemicals, cement 
aluminum, wind power equipment and refining (European Chamber of Com-
merce 2009) and continuing to rely on the massive consumption of coal as the 
major source of energy. But during this time the Chinese economy also had to 
start dealing with processes of structural change and began to show first signs 
of saturation in form of a slower growth rate and difficulties for companies to 
recruit workers (mingong huang) in China's eastern coastal provinces, which 
has been the pinnacle of the country's industrial miracJe. Together with 
industrial development, pollution also started to move from the eastern parts 
toward China's inner and western provinces. 
During the 12th Chinese five-year plan (2011-2015) we see these trends 
continue. The current Chinese leadership under President Xi Jinping and 
prime minister Li Keqiang has followed the footsteps of its predecessors Hu 
Jintao and Wen Jiabao in endorsing and further developing a strong environ-
mental agenda for the country. Aware of the weak prospects for recovering 
a growth rate of over 10%, Chinese government rhetoric shifted towards 
accepting the "New Normal State" (xin changtai), which promises an average 
growth rate of still 7.5%, but more social equity and environmental protection 
in turn. By claiming to focus more on the environmental and social aspects of 
economic development and promoting the idea of "harmonious society" and 
"inclusive growth" (baorongxing zengzhang), the Chinese government can 
claim the more sluggish economy is at least in part due to stricter and better-
enforced environmental regulations. 
As far as the overall sustainability agenda is concerned, the Chinese govern-
ment tries to leverage its "top-level design" (dingceng sheji) to build appro-
priate institutions supporting China becoming an "Ecological Civilization."1 
Also the concept "Corporate Social Responsibility" plays an important role 
in this institutional architecture and has been instrumentalized widely by 
Chinese language media, government agencies and non-governmental actors, 
with the Chinese Academy of Social Science (CASS) spearheading official 
research about CSR (reporting) of Chinese companies since 2009. 
CSR was first officially mentioned in China's new company law of 2006. 
Therein it was stated that "corporations in their business operations must 
abide by the law(s), regulations, social and business morality and good faith 
rules, must accept supervision by government and the public, and must 
undertake social responsibilities" (Company Law, 2006). Other official bod-
ies followed suit: the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration 
Commission ofthe State Council (SASAC), which is in charge of supervising 
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Chinese state owned enterprises (SOEs), implemented its own CSR guide-
lines in December 2007, and the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) drafted 
CSR guidelines for foreign invested enterprises in August 2008. According to 
a report by Syntao, a Chinese CSR consulting firm, 1722 Chinese companies 
issued CSR reports in 2012, a large increase from just one in 2006--the state 
owned enterprise State Grid (Marquis 2013a). By 2010, all SOEs in China's 
top 20 ranked Fortune companies, publish either a sustainable development 
report or a CSR report. (Fox 2011: 80) Syn tao estimates that in 2012, 22.6% 
of central government-led enterprises issued CSR reports compared to only 
9.4% of private enterprises (Marquis, 2013a). What is more, a survey of all 
411 published Chinese CSR reports in the first quarter of 2013 shows that 
only 10% were from non-publicly traded companies (Syntao, 2013: 26). 
This underscores the top-down argument that CSR is to a large extent driven 
forward by either the Chinese government or the financial regulator. China's 
SOEs have more direct political pressure to fulfill official guidelines and are 
therefore more prone to do CSR reporting as a part of compliance. On the 
other hand, SOEs often have advantages over private enterprises in terms of 
political connectedness, soft-budget constraints and easier access to credit. 
In addition, many privately listed Chinese companies have jumped on the 
CSR bandwagon "mainly for windowdressing," a reason often mentioned to 
the author in interviews with Chinese entrepreneurs conducted in Zhejiang 
province in summer and fall 2014. 
China Dialogue notes that China's top-down, governmentally driven 
approach to sustainability may have advantages when it comes to the rapid 
construction of a policy and regulatory framework, but its weakness is that 
the actual behavior of the companies does not necessarily get better as a 
result. The problem is a lack of supervision and high monitoring costs. Very 
telling in this regard are the cases of two Chinese national CSR champions 
who were lauded for their reporting, Baogang Steel and China National 
Petroleum Corporation (CNPC). Despite their impeccable official CSR 
record, these companies were shown to emit large amounts of heavy metals 
and chemicals, polluting air, soil and water, with devastating health effects 
on the surrounding local population. (Marquis, 2013b). 
This shows that good CSR reporting and bad CSR are not contradictory, 
each of them has their purpose. Like a second generation entrepreneur run-
ning a small and medium-sized enterprise (SME) in the printing business in 
coastal Ningbo put it: "CSR, yes ... we are doing it as well ... my personal 
opinion is that it is all window dressing, we do it to show it to our clients." 
While there is still no unanimous definition as to what exactly counts as 
CSR, its value has clearly been recognized by the different interest groups 
and made part of the mainstream rhetoric of government, business and civil 
society. However, every group endorses CSR for a different reason and is 
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prone to instrumentalizing the concept for its own agenda. The government 
uses CSR as a way to demand Chinese companies to contribute toward a 
"harmonious society," trying to dampen the disruptive effects that their busi-
ness activity has on society and the environment. The official understanding 
of CSR in China can be very wide and comprises things like paying taxes 
and abiding by the law, making donations to social welfare organizations, 
meeting pollution guidelines, publishing CSR reports, phasing out inefficient 
production technologies, etc. For the Chinese government, another important 
reason for endorsing CSR is that the concept is a useful umbrella term, which 
is helpful for the alignment of conflicting interests within different factions 
of the party and society. The CCP uses CSR to strengthen its leadership and 
legitimacy by reserving its role as a mediator who strikes a balance among 
the country's different stakeholders and interest groups (Fox, 2011: 204). For 
Chinese corporations, on the other hand, CSR is mainly a form of window 
dressing (zuoxiu) and reaching out to the public with the aim of building up 
the strategic brand value of the company. Companies know very well what 
the society and the government expects from them, and therefore often react 
by taking a somewhat calculated stance on CSR. The problem with that, I 
argue, is that CSR, in the way it is presented by government and academia, .is 
mostly a normative concept that is purely interest-driven (instead of purpose-
driven) and imposed on companies from above (instead of arising intrinsi-
cally). Lamentably, in most research about CSR the subject of analysis is not 
the behavior of the company as such, but rather topics such as government 
policy and stakeholder pressure, CSR reporting or hypothetical win-win situ-
ations between CSR and corporate strategy in the name of company value 
maximization. The perspectives of the actual companies and entrepreneurs, 
the problems and restraints they face in implementing environmental respon-
sibility within their business, are often included only on a cursory level. 
Interviews with practitioners suggest that the win-win constellations invoked 
by policymakers and the academic literature do often not apply. 
What is good for the environment and public health is not necessarily good 
for business. And, as the next part suggests, the development of human civili-
zation in might be of a for the 
and not in the West. 
CHINA'S RELATIONSHIP WITH THE ENVIRONMENT 
IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
In the context of CSR and sustainability in China, it is to show the 
debate about cultural influences on destruction and the ques-
tion of who to blame for the China and the world 
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have to Chinese discourses, it was the Western mode 
of capitalist and modernization that has to take the sole blame for 
the world's environmental crisis. There is definitely truth in this observed link 
between economic prosperity and environmental crisis. Dennis Meadows, the 
author of The Limits to Growth ( l 972) even argues that the word "sustainable 
development" is already a contradiction in itself (DerStandard, 2012). 
China as a country conscious of its several thousand years of civiliza-
like other developing tried to "modernize" its economy 
deliberate reform as a reaction to confronted with an 
and expanding If it was not for the forceful integration of China 
into the world system by the means of "unequal treaties,"2 China would 
have continued to live embedded in its traditional agrarian society and social 
order. Therefore, the Chinese narrative is about ancient China's long-lasting 
harmony between human civilization and the environment, which was only 
recently disturbed by China's contact with the capitalist West and the ensuing 
development imperative being imposed on China. 
With regard to human-environment relations, it is often evoked not without 
some nostalgia, by Chinese and some Western scholars, that ancient China 
used to be an ecologically friendly civilization and that it was Western civili-
zation that brought environmental destruction on our earth. It is true that only 
the globalization of the capitalist mode of production has made possible the 
unprecedented level of pollution and resource depletion humanity is facing in 
the twenty-first century. However, to argue that ancient civilizations in gen-
eral and, China in particular, were the epitome of sustainability would also 
hit very far from historical facts. In contrast to Chinese versions heralding 
the harmony between humans and the environment in ancient China, Watts 
(2010), Elvin (2008) Shapiro (2001) and Roetz (1996; 1984) wrote very 
critical accounts that disparage China's history of environmental destruction. 
They show that China's long history of more than 3000 years of successful 
agricultural cultivation is closely linked to population growth and environ-
mental destruction. Furthermore, the authors make the claim that, similar to 
Christianity and utilitarian theories in the West, nature has traditionally been 
viewed in China under its use value and not as something independent and 
worth protecting for the sake of itself. This contradiction was described by 
Heiner Roetz with the remark that "ancient China was as hostile toward for-
ests as it was fond of individual trees." As a further example, Heiner Roetz 
notes the famous Yellow River, which got its name due to environmental 
degradation and the top soil erosion it caused and bears its name only since 
the middle of the first millennium. Also, the flooding in the northern Chinese 
plains that has caused the deaths of millions is not the result of unchange-
able natural conditions but rather of the long-term consequences of massive 
environmental degradation (Roetz, 1996). The Book of Songs still testifies 
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of the existence of broad forest lands during the Western Zhou dynasty. The 
massive destruction of forests has not happened until the beginning of the 
Iron Age, toward the middle of the first millennium (Roetz, 1984, 86-102). 
As far as the period of pre-reform communist China under Mao is con-
cerned, Shapiro shows in her book Mao's war against nature (2001) that 
during the time of the chairman, which was renowned for its mega-projects 
aimed at "conquering nature" like in The Great Leap Forward ( 1958-1961 ), 
was devastating for forests and ecosystems. Even more than in capitalist 
economies, the Mao era was all about imposing the human will (the chair-
man's will) upon nature. Wu Xiaobo, one of China's most prolific authors on 
the history of Chinese entrepreneurs, describes in the last chapter of his book 
"The gains and losses of several generations of economic reform" (2013) how 
pollution was a complete anathema during this period. Pollution was always 
thought to be a by-product of the capitalist mode of production. It was not 
recognized as something which can occur in a communist country. Smoking 
chimneys were for a long time seen as the epitome of industrialization and 
thus development. Famous is in this context chairman Mao's quote that he 
likes (Beijing, to be) a modem city and hopes that "it is all chimneys when 
he looks down from Tiananmen" (Fenghuang, 2013). 
Roetz argues that the idea of culture having primacy over the environ-
ment is deeply ingrained in Chinese civilization. Therefore, he (1996, 162) 
does not believe it to be likely that a real solution of the environmental 
dilemma will come out of China. He marks "what is missing in China are 
mostly the technological capabilities, not missing is a reckless preparedness 
to use them." In contrast to other Asian countries, Latin America and Africa, 
China's ecological devastation was not a result of Western corporations but 
mainly of Chinese cultural practices themselves (Roetz, 149-150). Even the 
philosophy of Daoism, is according to Roetz ( 1984 ), not empathical toward 
nature out of itself, but merely because human civilization has been ravaging 
nature to such a degree that the nostalgia toward nature found in Daoism was 
a reaction to it. 
Jorgen Randers, on the other hand, thinks that the environmental dilemma 
is to be solved by China for the benefit of the world. "I it will be 
the Chinese who solve the global climate challenge-singlehandedly 
a sequence of 5-year plans established with a clear long term vision. They are 
already well on the way ... " (Randers, 20I 2b). In his book 2052, he compares 
China's growth trajectory to that of other East Asian countries and points to 
the advantages of an authoritarian government in pushing for necessary top-
down environmental reforms (Randers, 2012a: 27). 
Jonathan Watts (2010, chapter the 
dent, disagrees with Randers' assessment 
that 
former China correspon-
the efficiency of the Chinese 
"Makers" 
- ..... ~, .. , it contains the worst elements of both. At the top, the state 
to impose pollution regulations and wildlife conservation 
while at the bottom citizens lack the democratic tools of a free press, 
independent courts, and elections to defend their land, air, and water. The gap in 
between is filled by local governments, township enterprises, migrant workers, 
and foreign corporations, many of which are focused on economic growth at the 
expense of all else. The result is neither red nor green; it is black or gray. 
is concentrated in this bulging middle belt, which is also the main source of cor-
and With such weak and accountability, 
rubbish can be sent to Guangdong southern coastal v1s-a-v1s 
Hong Kong) in the name of nonhazardous but the end result is often 
toxic rubbish dumps that damage the health of local people. 
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Basically, we can conclude that the dichotomy between nature and 
human civilization is not something exclusive to capitalism and modernity. 
Also the Chinese civilization has a long history of environmental destruc-
tion; capitalism and new technologies have just made it much worse. How-
ever, it would be a mistake to reify culture into something detached from 
the individual, from time and history. Instead of trying to shift the blame 
between civilizations and ideologies it will be more helpful to turn our 
attention to the actual responses available to environmental pollution and 
ecological degradation. 
RESPONSES TO CHINA'S ENVIRONMENT AL 
CRISIS AND CRITICAL REFLECTIONS ON CSR 
Researchers are divided as to whether it is the government or civil society that 
should take the lead in acting against pollution. While the bulk of Chinese 
literature focuses on the leading role of the government in implementing the 
right regulatory mechanisms that safeguard the environment, most Western 
scholars emphasize the importance of independent civil society organizations 
such as NGOs, foundations or interest groups that can act on behalf of the 
public or their constituency so as to pressure for environmental legislation 
and supervision of polluting companies. 
What these two approaches have in common, however, is that they explain 
the causes of CSR as something external to Chinese companies that has to 
be imposed either from the State in a top-down fashion or from society in a 
bottom-up fashion or from foreign companies from the outside in.3 Almost 
never is CSR in China discussed as something that arises intrinsically from 
Chinese companies, with the exception that it is good for profit. 
Looking at recent academic contributions about CSR in China, Tan-
Mullins and Hofman (2014: 3) named Chinese political will and international 
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pressure as the main drivers of CSR. Elizabeth Economy uses the dimensions 
"top-down," "bottom-up" and "from the outside in" (Economy, 2013). 
The possibility that Chinese entrepreneurs, by means other than "coercion" 
and "nudging," could be positive actors in the field of sustainability out of 
their own volition and personal purpose is not seriously conceived. The 
problem of the concept "CSR" in its dominant way of usage is the focus on 
interest-drivenness instead of purpose-drivenness. At the heart lies a flawed 
conception of economic actors, be they individuals or corporations, as "ratio-
nal maximizers." 
Among the below mentioned drivers of CSR in Table 5.1, I want to par-
ticularly emphasize the dimension "from the inside out," stressing that entre-
preneurs and their companies can be thoughtful actors that ought to be taken 
serious in environmental protection through their actions. It is also a call for 
a more human-oriented, interpretive form of social science research which 
focuses on "understanding" (verstehen) entrepreneurs and "making sense of 
their lived experience" as the empirical foundation for writing about CSR and 
sustainability. Therefore, this approach tries to show CSR and the problems 
attached to its realization as they are perceived by the entrepreneurs and also 
shows sustainability as something that exists beyond the profit paradigm. 
Table 5.1 provides an overview of the drivers of CSR and sustainability 
along with the key stakeholders and depicts if action is intrinsically or extrin-
sically propelled. In implementation, these subcategories are mutually non-
exclusive and rather cross-fertilize each other.4 
Table 5.1 Drivers of CSR, Actors and Motivation 
Drivers of CSR and 
Sustainability in China 
State: Top-down 
Ordol iberal ist institutions: 
bottom-up 
From the outside in 
Interests: branding, window-
dressing, access to resources 
and social networks 
Purpose: from the inside out 
Relevant Actors 
Chinese Government 
Civil society organizations, 
pollution victims, traditional 
and social media, 
stakeholders, government 
that creates and defends 
ordoliberal institutions 
Foreign companies, foreign 
governments, foreign media, 
Chinese Entrepreneurs 
Chinese entrepreneurs 
Motivation Type 
for Entrepreneurs 
External 
External 
External 
Intrinsic 
Intrinsic 
Notes: Table 5.1 presents a little overview of the drivers of CSR and sustainability together with the relevant 
actor groups and shows whether action is or extrinsically motivated. In practice, these catego-
ries are mutually non-exclusive but rather coexist cross-fertilize each other. 
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Regardless of it in China or the behavior is 
explained to us by referring to the homo economicus and rational choice the-
ory. This, however, leads to a reification of CSR into something that does not 
serve its originally intended purpose. It is prone to shift social responsibility 
from the realm of intrinsically motivated purposive behavior to the calculated 
and performative domain of CSR reporting and CSR as window dressing. In 
conventional CSR theory, neither the top-down 
the ordoliberal approaches see a '"!",""'""'"'·'" 
other than rational maximizers. Companies are seen as the "takers" of 
government policy or civil society action, who are to be "nudged" toward 
socially and legally acceptable forms of behavior through a "carrots and 
sticks approach." The sticks are the formal rules like the law or bad publicity 
by the media that will in turn impact profits. The carrots part of the game is 
encapsulated in the win-win narrative that morally right company behavior 
will automatically lead to more profits, thereby linking corporate responsibil-
ity to the value strategy of a company (compare Freeman, 1984). This win-
win narrative between a company's value and socially responsible behavior 
is the pre-analytic vision on which, unfortunately, a great deal of CSR litera-
ture and initiatives are built on. Another approach focuses on "international 
embeddedness," according to which the main driver of CSR in China comes 
"from the outside in," mainly through the management of supply chains by 
foreign companies. Accordingly, international pressure from other countries 
plus more sustainable management practices from foreign companies will 
create sufficient pressure on Chinese companies to emulate. 
Pu Ngai (2005, taken from Unger, 2008: 84) observed 
when the Western companies that purchase their products from Chinese-based 
factories first pressed upon the supplier factories in the 1990s, the factory man-
agers came under pressure to make the production lines safer and to comply 
with China's labor law in terms of wages and work hours. 
One aspect which is scarce in the approaches outlined above are investiga-
tions into the actual lifeworld of entrepreneurs who are according to rational 
choice theory nothing more but "agents," instead of "actors." The pinnacle 
of conventional theory goes so far as to suggest that in order to survive com-
panies don't have an other choice but to maximize profits, and therefore, this 
gives them a free pass for irresponsible behavior. The obvious result is that 
we look toward state, civil society or foreign companies as the only means of 
reining in pollution and creating the right framework to ensure what we judge 
as "fair" competition. 
What I intend to do is to show that CSR in China is not only something 
external that is imposed on rational agents, be they individual entrepreneurs 
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or companies from the outside, but also that some Chinese companies are pro-
tagonists of sustainability and CSR, acting out of "intrinsical purposiveness," 
and not out of "interest-drivenness."5 This bifurcation between purpose and 
interest will force us to engage more thoroughly with the notion of "entrepre-
neurs" and their institutional realities in China. 
CHINESE ENTREPRENEURS AS TAKERS AND MAKERS 
OF SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT AND CSR 
Chinese Entrepreneur 
According to Gabler Economics Dictionary (Springer Gabler, 2015), the 
ideal type of an entrepreneur is a natural person, who in his/her quality of 
the owner "plans, establishes and/or independently and responsibly man-
ages an enterprise, taking upon himself/herself personal or financial risk." 
Thomas Heberer, who wrote an early book about Chinese entrepreneurs, 
describes entrepreneurs as "actors" (2003: 92) echoing Joseph A. Schum-
peter who identifies creativity, innovation and leadership as key qualities of 
entrepreneurs. The notion of the entrepreneur as an actor is different from 
the neoclassical theory that looks at individuals as agents. While agents are 
predetermined and can be modeled, entrepreneurs are creative innovators. 
Most importantly in my opinion, Schumpeter argues that "the entrepreneur 
has to defend himself/herself against the reproach of deviant social behavior" 
(Schumpeter, 1928; 1987: 149-151 ). I want to build on this characteristic, 
namely the definition of an entrepreneur as someone who "deviates from the 
socially accepted norm." This deviance is captured best, in my opinion, by 
the term transgressing and describes what I understand as the key quality of 
entrepreneurs in the widest sense.6 Entrepreneurs as "transgressing actors" 
are different from the conception of passive, instrumentally rational, profit-
maximizing automatons that spilled over from neoclassical economics into 
other areas of social science research, and which unfortunately has been 
dominant in CSR research so far. The with rational choice is 
its and materialistic connotations that banalize altruism as hidden 
self-interest and fatalistically see capital-accumulation and shareholder obe-
dience as the final purpose of all economic activity. In contrast, Austrian-born 
American management guru Peter Drucker argued that a business is about 
purpose rather than profit. Purpose is something internal to the company and 
its managers, not something imposed from the outside. The problem with the 
CSR discourse of today is that many academics, and practitioners 
have been so focused on viewing companies as 
that dismissed the most 
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behavior, namely the "subjective purpose." By doing so, they dismissed the 
key to understand and explain to what extent a business is prepared to assume 
social and environmental responsibility. 
Coming back to the point on entrepreneurs as transgressing actors, as a pre-
condition that there is something to transgress beyond, create and innovate, 
we have to appreciate that people do not exist in a vacuum, but are always 
embedded in a specific historical context. The history of Chinese entrepre-
neurs is of course firmly embedded in China's economic and political reform 
process. If there was no economic reform, there would have been no new 
class of Chinese entrepreneurs since the 1980s. As Chinese entrepreneur-
scholar Wu Xiaobo trenchantly marked, "the Chinese managers before the 
1980s could not really be referred to as entrepreneurs, as their biggest deci-
sion power was to fix the toilet." 
Many of the first generation of Chinese private entrepreneurs were mar-
ginalized people who had nothing to lose, or people who were employed in 
the state sector and then "entered the ocean" (xiahai) and started their own 
business, leaving the safety of the "iron rice bowl." As to the classification 
of Chinese companies, private enterprises are referred to as getihu or miny-
ing, depending on company size, whereas managers in the public sector are 
referred to as guoying and dajiti, and guanshang/guanying refers to former 
officials who became the private owners of sold SOEs (compare Lin, 2006: 
255 in Nonini, 2008: 160). 
After Deng Xiaoping's southern tour in 1992 and the liberating message 
that it is virtuous to become rich, the next boost for the official recognition 
of entrepreneurs by the Chinese State came in 2002 through president Jiang 
Zemin's theory of the three represents. From that point on, Chinese entre-
preneurs have been allowed to join the CCP. This represents an important 
turning point as it marks the full political rehabilitation of entrepreneurs as a 
class from the vestiges of Maoist class struggle. 
A THEORETICAL ACCOUNT OF CSR IN CHINA 
After the introductory account on entrepreneurs in the Chinese context, I 
want to turn to the theoretical aspects of CSR. Corporate social responsibility 
has become an increasingly popular topic of research about China. The Jour-
nal of Current Chinese Affairs has devoted a whole edition to CSR in China 
in December 2014. The edition had a lot of insights into both state-led and 
NGO-led activities. What is rarer to find in most published materials about 
our topic are phenomenological accounts of social responsibility, that is to 
say, intrinsic first-hand accounts on CSR in China from the perspective of 
Chinese managers or business owners that give insights into questions such as 
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what is the intrinsic purpose behind CSR activities? or how do entrepreneurs 
perceive of certain difficult CSR situations? 
A simple example would be Luo Shaolin's research on the manufactur-
ing sector in Guangdong, which is rich in accounts from his field study 
and relies on personal accounts of entrepreneurs to argue that tighter CSR 
standards would jeopardize China's advantage in the supply of cheap labor 
(Luo, 2010: 17): 
85% of existing Chinese enterprises will become bankrupt once they are forced 
to adopt such standards. (Moreover,) Chinese firms' major advantage in cheap 
labor will disappear, and foreign investors will seek substitutes in other Asian 
countries such as Thailand and Vietnam. Consequently, the whole economy will 
face great challenges or even collapse. Furthermore, existing CSR (is purely) 
strategy-driven and market-oriented. 
With regard to social responsibility, Anita Chan pointed to a similar 
dilemma in the realm of workers' rights, noting that "with local govern-
ments competing with each other to attract new industrial investment, there 
have been concerted efforts by local governments to sideline the local trade 
unions" (2015: 79). 
Another dimension which is often missing in contributions about CSR in 
China is a rich description of the institutional embeddedness which facilitates 
action. In my opinion any attempt to explain CSR in general, but in the Chi-
nese context in particular, will be futile if it does not take into account the 
relative malleableness of formal institutions and personal networks as central 
nodal points for accessing resources. 
Distinctive notoriety deserves the relationship between local officials and 
entrepreneurs as one of mutual dependence and granting favors, of successive 
leveraging and yielding. Their relationship and network could be described 
as a "resource community," with their constant and ceremonial interactions 
serving the commonly identified purpose of appropriating, creating and dis-
posing of (scarce) resources and complementing each other in their for 
purpose, money and power. Local officials need to on the 
wealth and job creation by entrepreneurs as the very life-blood of the local 
economy and the lever for their career promotion, whereas entrepreneurs 
on good connections with the cadres as a means of gaining access to commis-
sions, land, tax exemptions and a safer business operating environment with 
more political certainty and a lesser chance of being expropriated. 
These networks are sustained by regular ceremonial-like interactions and 
gift-exchanges. Granted favors to entrepreneurs can be rewarded through 
that range from presumptuous meals, evenings, travel 
Patek cars and even studios. 
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We should not forget that these "communities" and the relations between 
corporations and the local government that embody them, have very serious 
implications for resource deployment and distribution, and thus for CSR and 
sustainable development. The way they impact the environment is a decisive 
factor in environmental pollution and sustainability. 
There is quite some literature available on the mutual embeddedness 
between the entrepreneurial private sector and the state, as well as the many 
implications these networks have for accessing resources (Eaton & Kostka, 
2014; Wu Xiaobo, 2013; Brodsgard, 2012; Dickson, 2007; Krug, 2004). The 
literature focuses mainly on the economic aspects of this "purpose communi-
ties" between entrepreneurs and officials. What can be distilled from the lit-
erature is the existence of "configurations of common interest and meaning" 
between entrepreneurs and local officials. 
Su and He (2009) deserve a separate mention for our research, as they 
connect their research on corporate philanthropy with culture-specific theo-
ries about political connectedness. They were able to show that corporate 
philanthropy in China is closely linked to making political connections and to 
gaining access to scarce resources like bank loans, tax deductions, etc. 
(We) find the significant positive relationship between enterprise philanthropy 
donation and enterprise profitability, ... simply put, Chinese private enterprises 
carried out philanthropy activities to better protect property rights and nurture 
political connections, which in tum, leads to better enterprise profitability. The 
result is even stronger in institutions weaker provinces.' 
On a methodological level, I think it is important to see the state and the pri-
vate sector not as monolithic entities and recognize that the identities between 
them are often blurred and do change over time. A good deal of private 
entrepreneurs used to be government officials before they entered the ocean 
( xiahai), and managers of restructured state-owned enterprises also dispose of 
sufficient decision-power that they count as entrepreneurs, even though they 
have less financial risk. Brodsgard (2012) and Duckett (2001) describe the 
phenomenon of the political entrepreneur in China, which is by no means a 
new phenomenon. It has a long tradition, dating at least back to the hongding 
shangren or guanshang of nineteenth-century Qing dynasty. Political author-
ity has been tied to distributional power in ancient China and so is it today. 
A FIELDWORK ACCOUNT OF CSR IN CHINA 
From July to November 2014 I had undertaken various fieldtrips to conduct 
interviews with Chinese entrepreneurs in Beijing, as well as Zhejiang and 
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Jiangsu province. The majority of my interview partners were from private 
companies in the manufacturing sector, mostly in chemical or paper indus-
try, hazardous waste incineration, electrical appliances or the restaurant 
business. 
From the perspective of Chinese entrepreneurs, the reality of the fre-
quently-quoted win-win solutions between sustainability and profits is that 
environmental sustainability often comes together with real trade-offs, 
especially for Chinese SMEs, which often do not have the financial, techni-
cal and social resources to acquire environmental equipment and to comply 
with new regulations. There are two possible ways where this might lead to: 
first, the Chinese government might look at stricter top-down environmental 
regulations as a positive selection process that keeps the good companies and 
discards the bad ones (yousheng lietai). According to interviews with private 
businesses conducted in the coastal provinces Jiangsu and Zhejiang in sum-
mer 2014, entrepreneurs confirmed that there has been increased pressure 
from the regulators over the past years and that the environmental regula-
tions are slowly beginning to be enforced. In Fuyang, a traditional center of 
the Chinese paper industry in coastal Zhejiang for example, government-led 
initiatives aimed at improving efficiency and environmental protection have 
reduced the number of Chinese private businesses from 400 to less than 50 
during the last 7 years. Smaller companies would sell their business to bigger 
ones and the local government would support smaller businesses dropping 
out or changing profession (zhuanhang) with an additional subsidy (peitao 
zijin). 
Zhejiang province, where Fuyang is located, is not just one of the most 
developed provinces economically, but also has comparatively strict envi-
ronmental regulations and in recent years, its people have been known for 
not shying away from public protests if they spot a polluting factory in their 
neighborhood, such as the resistance against PX-factories (petrochemical fac-
tories) has shown. Compared to China as a whole, we see that both the offi-
cial environmental regulations as well as the local enforcement by Chinese 
officials are highly dependent on the region, with environmental regulations 
on a general rule the in the more developed and environmen-
conscious eastern coastal and gradually decreasing in 
throughout the Chinese west. The logical consequence is that there is a sig-
nificant number Chinese companies in environmentally sensitive industry 
sectors that opt for simply circumventing stricter regulations by shifting their 
production lines into a less developed western province. There, investors are 
more than welcome in the hope that they change the economic fortunes of 
the local population. 
This phenomenon of of into the hinterland was 
an in the author's interviews with private in 
Chinese Companies as "Takers" and "Makers" 193 
the paper industry, chemical industry and detergent industry in the cities of 
Hangzhou, Fuyang, Shaoxing and Zhenjiang. With environmental regulation 
on the rise in coastal Zhejiang and Sunan (the more developed southern part 
of Jiangsu province), many entrepreneurs shift their production lines to Subei 
(the less developed northern part of Jiangsu province) or the more western 
provinces such as Anhui, Guizhou, Hunan, and Henan. 
As an official of the environmental protection bureau in Nanjing has 
argued at a conference in November 2014, "in order to curb our city's air 
pollution we are prepared to take strong steps, including the phasing .out of 
outdated production technologies, having polluting companies move into the 
industrial park for more efficient monitoring, cutting down on overcapac-
ity in certain industries and reducing the share of coal in the overall energy 
composition." However, when I was asking where many of the more pollut-
ing private companies moving out of the city were going, he was fair enough 
to confirm that it is not within his jurisdiction and insinuated that it is not 
unlikely for them to shift to a less regulated area. This disconnect or lack of 
coordination between the different jurisdictions and government entities was 
also an emergent topic in several interviews I conducted in summer and fall 
of 2014 in Jiangsu, Zhejiang and Beijing. 
Mr. Li, for example, a private entrepreneur from Ningbo in the painting 
industry said that the problem is one of coordination between different orga-
nizations. "Many officials just don't think beyond the area that immediately 
affects them." There is a disconnect of available knowledge between govern-
ment cadres, the industry and between different organizational entities, with 
sometimes overlapping jurisdiction about the environment.7 The means to 
attack this disconnect is through the further integration of available but scat-
tered information through better communication, for example by using smart 
technology. The Chinese government has made the "internalization" of China 
a top priority so it will be interesting to see what fruits the next years will bring 
in this regard. 
Some of the most important initiatives about transparency in recent years, 
however, do not come from the government, but have been organized by 
civil society actors. One of the most prominent examples is environmental 
activist Ma Jun and his organization IPE. IPE has managed to devise a web 
application called China Blue Sky App (Weilan) (formerly China Pollution 
Map), where real-time data of polluting companies in the user's vicinity can 
be screened. This is a considerable feat which would be the envy of regula-
tors even in the European Union or United States. IPE mainly makes avail-
able data made public by the local bureaus of environmental protection but 
also by pollution whistle blowers and civil society. A lot of information is 
publicly available but it is very dispersed and difficult to get a hold of for a 
single person. What IPE is doing is to present it in a visible and coherent way. 
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It is a great initiative without any doubt. The problem however is that 
at the ground level not everything that is measurable will be measured and 
companies who do not want to be scrutinized can get ways out. A manager 
of a pollution measuring factory in Nanjing who is officially designated to 
be in charge of the installation of filter equipment for Chinese companies in 
Jiangsu and Zhejiang was telling the author: "our technologies are fine, this 
is not the problem, the real crux of the issue is with the management level 
(guanli cengmian). There are many tricks as to how to make sure that you are 
not caught as a polluter." Interviews with Chinese entrepreneurs have con-
firmed this phenomenon. One might be required by the government to use a 
filter equipment, but after having acquired it, one unexpectedly finds out that 
the operational costs are very expensive too, for which reason the device is 
simply not switched on. Another way is to discharge waste water not in the 
pipe where pollutants are measured but through a secret second pipe. 
Local officials often collude with the entrepreneurs and tum a blind eye, 
as they know of the importance of those enterprises to the local economy or 
might regard it as a kind of trade of power for wealth. With the ongoing fight 
against corruption that President Xi Jinping has taken upon the party and 
himself, the latter of those options might have become more difficult. 
Apart from the moral dispositions of officials to either being clean and 
honest (qingguan) or corrupt (tanguan,) we see that there are a host of "struc-
tural factors" and "constraints" that shape human behavior. First of all, there 
is strong competition among Chinese local government officials in order to 
attract investment from coastal provinces. The local government vies for 
scarce investments from Chinese and foreign entrepreneurs with tax benefits, 
cheap or free land and factory premises, etc. 
As a rule of thumb, the more remote and less developed the region is, the 
more benefits an entrepreneur can expect from the government. Like an entre-
preneur investing in factories in southern Dongguan put it "1st tier cities are 
difficult to deal with, it makes now much more sense to go to 2nd tier and 3rd 
tier cities. One feels that the government and the local economy really value 
your investment there and award often generous benefits in the form of land 
use, facilities or tax lax enforcement 
of environmental may also be such a factor to attract 
investment. 
When asked about the balance between the economy and the environ-
ment, a local cadre in Taijiang county in Guizhou, who is responsible for 
economic investments, told the author that their main focus is on developing 
the local economy, while not infringing the bottom-line of environmental 
protection ( dixian). In other words, this means that pollution is okay as long 
as it does not lead to social that social the 
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sacrosanct This could suggests that government efforts to curb 
environmental pollution be more motivated fear of social unrest 
than the cause of environmental conservation itself. 
Guizhou is one of China's least developed provinces, and it has a very 
beautiful but fragile environment. The responsible cadre I interviewed called 
it a "balancing act between development and environmental conservation." 
"We are to do what we can .... There are special for pol-
industries ... there is in the region where n,u,u-,umcv, 
is allowed the so as to limit the 
Another dimension I want to comment on is that of cultural aspects of 
the interaction between entrepreneurs and officials. It be difficult for 
honest cadres (qingguan) to survive amidst a culture of mutual favors and 
nepotism. A seasoned Beijing entrepreneur who is in the restaurant and 
bar business claimed "if you are not corrupt you will get pushed out of the 
group and the system ( of mutual favor-granting between entrepreneurs and 
officials)." This is a clear example of adverse selection (nixiang xuanze), 
keeping the greedy officials (tanguan) and crowding out the clean ones 
(qingguan). 
As to the relation of mutual favors he adds, "I know how to be good with 
them, if I was not on good terms with them (cadres), my restaurant would 
have been taken away already many years ago." With sources of income for 
local governments becoming increasingly tight after the 1994 tax reforms, 
officials have resorted to selling land use rights as a major form of income. 
Land use rights have become the key source of income for local govern-
ments. For a private entrepreneur, being politically connected can definitely 
help against arbitrary confiscation of land use rights in the name of "develop-
ment." Also, Barbara Krug (2004) has devoted a good part of her research to 
social capital and the way it secures the longevity of a company or business. 
From that perspective it makes sense that many Chinese entrepreneurs spend 
so much time and money on common dinners, Karaoke evenings, etc. It is a 
process of bonding between them and the officials. The result is a social con-
figuration of "entrepreneur and cadre" that negotiates a common understand-
ing among the two for the appropriation, creation and use of scarce means of 
production. Their connection is embedded in a record of mutual giving and 
receiving, demanding and yielding. 
After this account, which has been showing Chinese entrepreneurs as 
embedded in the context of state policy, I want to introduce in the next sec-
tion three short case studies of entrepreneurs as the initiators of socially and 
environmentally responsible action that qualify very much for what I termed 
purpose-driven, transgressing behavior in a previous section of this chapter, 
and what for me constitutes the decisive characteristic of an entrepreneur. 
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CHINESE ENTREPRENEURS AS SHAPERS OF CSR 
I want to present here a less well-known aspect of CSR in China, namely 
three cases of purpose-driven environmental responsibility by Chinese 
entrepreneurs. The first case is about Alashan SEE, China's first private anti-
desertification initiative founded by a group of Chinese entrepreneurs and one 
of China's biggest private donor association for Chinese grassroots NGOs. 
The second case is the Laoniu Foundation and the third case the private 
company Broad Group. After the short introduction, Table 5.2 will give an 
overview about the different characteristics of those companies. 
Alashan SEE Ecological Association 
Alashan SEE was founded by about 100 Chinese, mostly private entrepre-
neurs, in 2004 as an organization with the aim of restoring the fragile grassland 
and fighting desertification in Inner Mongolia's Alashan desert. It combines 
sustainable business strategies to develop local communities with measures 
aimed at grassland conservation. Guiding principles in their mission are local 
participation and self-governance, and an inclusive approach to working with 
different stakeholder groups like government and academia. By 2015, mem-
bership has grown to between 300 and 400 entrepreneurs. The large and varied 
business expertise of their members, they claim, is their biggest asset in doing 
charity. Apart from their trademark project in Alashan, Alashan SEE also acts 
as a donor for Chinese environmental NGOs all over the country. 
Table 5.2 Comparing Basic Characteristics of Cases of Purpose-Driven Chinese CSR 
Alignment of 
Name of Form of Ownership and 
Organization Founded by Organization Purpose or CSR Mission Management 
Alashan SEE About 100 Public To conserve the Strong 
Chinese foundation grassland and fight 
entrepreneurs since 2014, desertification in 
in 2004, private Alashan 
among them foundation To act as a 
Song Jun and since 2008, for Chinese 
Ren Zhiqiango environmental NGOs 
Laoniu Niu Gensheng Private Philantropy in the areas Strong 
Foundation in 2004 Foundation of education and rural 
development 
Broad Group Zhang Yue in Non-listed Selling energy-efficient Strong 
(Yuanda) 1992 Company technologies, 
buildings, providing 
high wages for 
workers 
Chinese 
The Laoniu Foundation was established in 2004 by the Niu Gensheng, the 
founder and former chairman of Mengniu Dairy company (founded in 1999), 
and his family, using all their shares and dividends in the company. It is a 
family foundation whose activities are mainly focused on funding education 
and creating economic for farmers in economically backward 
western China, training in the non-profit sector, environmental protection 
and disaster relief. Mr. Niu has to almost all his money to the 
Laoniu foundation after his death. from a poor 
Niu Gensheng sees a very strong purpose in~"''"~ ....... --~·-
others. 
The Broad Group (Yuanda Jituan) 
Founded by Zhang Yue in 1992 together with his brother Zhang Jian, the 
company specializes in air conditioners and air purifiers and sustainable 
buildings. The brothers parted ways and Zhang Yue became chairman and 
CEO of the company. Different from the other two foundations, the Broad 
Group's environmental responsibility strategy is embedded in its business 
model. It has recognized ecological degradation caused by human activity as 
the biggest problem today and sees it as its mission as a company to provide 
technological solutions that can save mankind and improve lives. Master-
mind Zhang Yue claims that Broad Group's corporate culture is modeled 
on the continental European Rhine model, which has a holistic approach to 
business, and not on the Anglo-Saxon model, where profits are at the center 
of business. 
Relying on material from my fieldwork, the last two sections of this chapter 
are aimed at giving lively accounts of how Chinese entrepreneurs and their 
companies are both takers and makers of CSR and sustainable develop-
ment in China. In the next section I have identified five emergent topics that 
deserve special attention when dealing with CSR in China and which high-
light the trends and contradictions that are linked to this field: voluntary giv-
ing versus paternalistic CSR, CSR as such versus quantitative measuring of 
CSR through reporting, SMEs versus SOEs, Corporate Governance and CSR 
and Environmental protection versus geographical displacement of pollution. 
EMERGENT TOPICS RELATED TO CSR IN CHINA 
Voluntary Giving Versus Paternalistic CSR 
Elizabeth Economy (2014) pointed out in her book By all means necessary 
that the main difference between CSR in China and the West is that CSR in 
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China is ordered top-down by the government, whereas in the West it is on 
a voluntary basis. 
It is true that CSR in China does have a stronger paternalistic undercurrent 
due to the often complex relations between government cadres and business 
entrepreneurs, however viewed in the light that "CSR" has evolved into 
a form of mainstream, it is nothing that any big, publicly traded company 
in China or the West can just turn its back upon. This pervasiveness of the 
CSR discourse unfortunately makes CSR very prone to window dressing. In 
an interview with an entrepreneur from Ningbo, the author was told about 
the interviewee's experience with the provincial water treatment project 
Wushui gongzhi, an official project aimed at improving water quality in 
Zhejiang province: "I donated about 300,000 RMB for this project ... one 
could of course refuse to donate ... but you know that if you are not paying, 
the government will find one day to pay it back to you." We can see from 
this account, that the determining factor in this donation was indeed social 
pressure due to the entrepreneur wanting to be on good terms with the local 
government, and not voluntariness. 
Apart from that, more and more companies do also recognize the strate-
gic value of giving. Sun and He (2009) describe how a wave of corporate 
philanthropy was born in China as a consequence of the 2008 Wenchuan 
earthquake. It was a public disaster of such significant scale and with 
enough media-coverage so as to take in the whole nation. Besides the 
personal sympathy for the afflicted, the fact that so many other companies 
were giving, and the high expectations of the whole nation created a sheer 
irresistible incentive and bandwagon-effect for Chinese entrepreneurs to 
give. Shan et al. (2009) show in their research that philanthropic activity 
can do both having a brand-supporting effect and improving the firm's 
performance. Using Wenchuan earthquake donation data from Chinese 
A share firms showed that philanthropic donations can indeed tally with 
shareholder interests, which is an argument in favor of the strategy value 
of voluntary giving. 
CSR as 
CSR 
CSR reports are meant as point of reference to measure whether a company 
behaves ethically toward wider society. Writing a good CSR report is a skill 
and Chinese companies who can afford it and recognize the value of such a 
spend between 20,000 and 30,000 Euros. Small companies will often 
not have the financial resources to get certified and spend such amounts. 
In China there is an ongoing about finding the right standards 
for CSR In 2014 the Chinese CSR company 
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has published new industry-sensitive standards of CSR reporting (see MQI 
2014). A drawback to relying excessively on CSR reporting as a yardstick 
for a company's social responsibility is the tendency to pay attention pre-
dominant to form, rather than content. A company that does not publish 
reports might behave responsibly and sustain a large social functionality 
over employment, sourcing of inputs, excellent service or responsible sup-
ply chain management. On the other hand, CSR reporting, especially for 
large publicly traded companies, has also become the norm in China, some-
times diluting effects on CSR and sustainability. Most corporations look at 
CSR as something they have to fulfill and which could benefit them in terms 
of strategy. Chinese companies are no exception in this regard. With more 
institutionalization of sustainability, they will be more likely to comply 
with the law and major political directives, but as a result they might have 
fewer resources available to be innovative about their own sustainability 
initiatives. Chinese reporting initiatives like the Syntao indicators and the 
Chinese Academy of Social Science (CASS) indicators focus too much 
on quantitative reporting. It can increase information transparency for the 
sake of better control but is insufficient for understanding entrepreneurs' 
decisions. 
In conclusion, enforcement of more stringent CSR standards and propaga-
tion of corporate culture will be conducive to a superficial "lege artis" level of 
CSR performance, but it will also create unforeseen problems, driving com-
panies to be innovative about saving costs. Therefore, focusing on external 
projections of responsibility like CSR reporting and quantitatively measure-
able parameters alone can not be the solution. 
In the end, we should be aware that relying on CSR reporting is no sub-
stitute for the initial effort of engaging Chinese entrepreneurs' actions and 
trying to make sense of their lifeworld, their motivations, values, purpose 
and constraints. 
SMEs Versus SOEs 
Another point critical for CSR in China are the structural differences between 
private companies and SOEs. Most privately owned companies are SMEs, 
most of which are owned and managed by the founding person of the com-
pany or are family businesses. Compared to the state sector, SMEs have to 
deal with greater difficulties to obtaining loans and a factor of political arbi-
trariness they can never efface completely. This underlines again the need of 
political connections to shield companies from this arbitrariness. Whereas 
entrepreneurs in coastal Zhejiang were claiming they don't have to deal a lot 
with the government, this political factor is stronger in China's less devel-
oped regions. 
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Regarding who is delivering better CSR, the SOEs and the private com-
panies have different ways of doing it. Private companies often do charity in 
things they think they can contribute and be good at, unlike SOEs, who basi-
cally go along with government objectives (Dongmei, 2009). 
Many scholars and practitioners do not agree with the CSR survey by the 
Chinese Academy of Social Science (CASS, 2009; 2014) pointing out that 
Chinese SOEs are more responsible than private companies. There has been, 
especially, in recent years a growing number of private entrepreneurs turning 
to philanthropy or setting up their own foundations. Examples are Alashan 
SEE Ecological Association, the Laoniu Foundation or the Xin Huadu foun-
dation. A private interview with a foreign expert in the Chinese petrochemi-
cal industry also suggested that "as far as business operations are concerned 
Chinese private companies are more prone to invest into new equipment and 
pay more attention to safety than large SOEs." 
Another contribution that does not cast a good light onto the social respon-
sibility of China's state sector is the recent documentary by Chai Jing (2015), 
showing that a lot of the problems in China's energy structure are to be found 
in big SOEs and their vested interests. They might publish impeccable CSR 
reports, but at the same time hold back crucial investments into upgrading 
technology and efficiency. 
We also see that the government tries to subordinate the private sector 
under the state sector in achieving national development goals. In recent 
years, this is exemplified by the dragon-head companies (longtou qiye), 
strategically important SOEs that occupy the center position in the com-
modity chain of a strategic industry, and the fact that the share of the public 
sector is increasing vis-a-vis the private sector (guojin mintui). Another 
aspect of the shift to top-down ordered CSR reporting in China is that it 
might further contribute to the crowding-out effect that big corporations 
and SOEs have on SMEs. This might further promote a form of adverse 
selection that favors big, resource-rich, politically well-connected, but not 
necessarily innovative companies that are more prone to see CSR as win-
dow dressing and a fad instead of something that serves their 
purpose as such. 
The relation between corporate governance type and CSR performance seems 
to be an immensely important but still underresearched phenomenon. Unfor-
tunately, there is not enough space here to offer a rich analysis. My main 
however, that some Chinese companies in which there is 
ment between and the management of the company, like 
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businesses, SMEs or first generation companies, exhibit a stronger attachment 
to purpose-driven environmental protection that is different in kind from what 
is understood as CSR in big SOEs or shareholding companies, where deci-
sion power and purpose of the enterprise have been more diluted by vested 
interests. This is a topic which definitely deserves deeper study. 
Environmental Protection Versus Geographical 
Displacement of Pollution 
With environmental protection and factor prices ramping up in China's 
eastern provinces, there is a worrying trend that polluting industries are 
transferred to less developed regions with laxer environmental regulation. 
In recent years, the industrial core of China's economy has been gradually 
shifting away from the coastal to the central and western provinces. As a 
result, the growth rates of Guangdong, Zhejiang and Jiangsu have been slow-
ing, while industrial production has increasingly moved to Anhui, Gansu, 
Jiangxi, Hunan, Guizhou, etc., which are growing fast due to investments 
and industry transfers from other provinces. If not managed accordingly, this 
industry-driven economic growth will pose serious threats to the environ-
ment and public health, especially, as these provinces are at the receiving end 
of China's pollution-intensive industries such as the chemical and smelting 
industry and lead battery production. 
The political scaffolding for this displacement of pollution is provided by 
China's Western development program (xibu dakaifa, 2001) and China's 
going out policy (zhongguo zouchuqu, 1999), both of which have received 
strong political impetus during the last decade. While the former shifts 
pollution into the Western parts of China, the latter adds the dimension of 
China realizing vast infrastructure projects abroad and the sourcing of raw 
materials mainly from markets in Africa, Latin America, Central Asia and 
South East Asia. These trends have strong implications for the geographi-
cal dimension of environmental pollution. Officially, the positive economic 
aspects of these developments are emphasized by government and the media. 
However, the danger is that as pollution shifts from the formally regulated 
or semi-regulated sector to the informal, it simply becomes less visible, but 
does not disappear. This is a phenomenon reminiscent of the window dress-
ing inherent in CSR reporting outlined earlier in the chapter. Secondly, the 
industry transfer is likely to increase pollution due to poor equipment and less 
stringent environmental regulations in the host communities. 
In the context of the shift to China's western provinces, the unintended 
ecological consequences might be extremely harsh. As pointed out by Ren-
min University's dean of the School of Environment and Natural Resources, 
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professor Ma Zhong (Xu, 2013), China's western provinces do not only have 
a very fragile ecological balance, but the wind and water cycles also go from 
the western parts to the east. Therefore, traditional pollution in the coastal 
provinces is comparatively less tragic. However, once China's industrial core 
has shifted to the west, air and water pollution will affect a bigger part of the 
country. China's large rivers originate in Western Qinghai province and wind 
through a large part of the country before meeting the sea. Therefore, indus-
trial pollution in the western part of China will invariably have more dreadful 
effects on the environment as a whole. 
CSR AND THE DEVELOPMENT IMPACT OF 
CHINESE COMPANIES ABROAD 
Several aspects have been listed about poor social and environmental per-
formance of Chinese companies outside of China. However, such as pointed 
out by Poulden (2013), being increasingly aware of their reputation, Chinese 
companies' standards are often more stringent abroad than they are at home 
and they are usually not as bad as their image. 
In order to get a broader image of Chinese companies activities abroad, 
one has to differentiate between petty private entrepreneurs, who have 
left China as part of a natural process of economic migration, and the big, 
mostly SOEs that go abroad as part of a state-led resource strategy. Chinese 
petty entrepreneurship is a phenomenon that is largely independent from 
state-led economic policies, such as a case study by Xiao (2015) about Chi-
nese entrepreneurs in Nigeria suggests. This is different in the strategically 
important extractive sector, where the key players are provincial SOEs, 
comprising about 88% of all Chinese firms investing abroad (Tan-Mullins, 
2015: 29). 
What is impressive is that both the big Chinese corporations but also petty 
businesses have become an economic force to perform a significant role 
in and reshape the landscape of international development, building new 
structures of economic cooperation and The Chinese 
government's initiatives have been bolstered recently by several multilateral 
institutional innovations like the call for a New-Silk-Road Initiative and the 
21st Century Maritime Silk Road 2014, the Asian Infrastructure Investment 
Bank (AIIB) 2015, and the New Development Bank (NDB) 2014, formerly 
known as the BRICS Bank. Each of these initiatives is endowed with multi-
billion-dollar investment sums. US political consultant Ian Bremmer (2015) 
referred to this development as a possible Chinese Marshall Plan with a one-
trillion-dollar 
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Of special to is the Silk Road Initiative with a 
to further integrate the Greek harbor of Piraeus (since 2009 under the 
administration of the SOE COSCO-China Ocean Group Com-
pany) with Eastern Europe over a Chinese-government financed railway 
project of 110 billion Euro. (DerStandard, 2015) Already Wen Jiabao has 
described Eastern Europe as China's bridge into Europe. If this is really 
into effect, it could contribute to a modern infrastructure in 
Eastern Europe more than the Union could in the near 
future afford to do. 
Recently, new infrastructure-investment projects have been mooted with 
Latin America, among them, the Trans-Amazonian Railway project, and 
President Xi Jinping vowed to invest $250 billion into the region (Renmin 
Wang, 2015: The Telegraph, 2015: Zhongguo Xinwen Wang, 2015). 
But not all mega-projects are state-led. It is remarkable that the recent 
concession to build the Nicaragua canal, whose costs were estimated at $50 
billion, was won by Chinese tycoon Wang Jing and his Hong Kong Nicaragua 
Canal Development Investment Co. (JHNK). If the canal is going to be built, 
the necessary know-how would still come mainly from Chinese state-owned-
enterprises. It would be of interest to know more details about the networks 
and doings behind the project and the informal extent of involvement of the 
Chinese government. 
China does of course follow personal interests in aligning its global invest-
ment strategy with the strategic access to natural resources, but it effectively 
builds at the same time the infrastructure in many Latin American, African, 
Central Asian, and in the near future, European countries. The deal at the cen-
ter of this partnership is usually "infrastructure in exchange for resources." In 
addition to hospitals, schools, highways, airports, etc., China builds the whole 
infrastructure necessary for the sourcing and transport of natural resources. 
In return, China gets access to these much valued resources for its national 
economy. 
As shown by the Chinese environmental NGO Green Watershed with the 
example of Chinese dam building projects in Burma, traditionally, Chinese 
companies thought that for doing business it would be enough to have good 
relations with the host government (Economy, 2013: 114). But in recent 
years there has come a growing awareness that it is important to engage the 
population and civil society organizations too. While still being relatively 
unexperienced on the international development arena, Chinese companies 
have a very steep learning curve and are, as a closer look will tell, not a worse 
partner than Western companies. Apart from the companies themselves, it 
is also the responsibility of the host country to put effective environmental 
regulations in place. 
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TOWARD A PURPOSE-ORIENTED APPROACH OF 
CSR AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 
As an official of the Ministry of Environmental Protection (MEP) mentioned 
to me during a conversation, "the foreign media are often not fair to China 
regarding the state of our environment. Our pollution is also connected to 
foreign countries' consumption patterns ... we know that (the state of) our 
environment is not good at the moment ... but we are grappling with it and 
at least we are trying to do something and to improve the situation." 
This reflects a common impression that China's efforts to curb pollution 
and improve the environment are often not seen and valued in the West. We 
should remember that Western Europe, the United States and Japan also 
took considerable time until environmental legislation had been adopted and 
well enforced. The developed countries trotted for a long time on the path 
"develop first, clean-up later." Due to China's sheer size, its own version of 
the "develop first, clean-up later" scenario creates unforeseen dimensions of 
both ecological distress and economic opportunities for the world. It will take 
time but, according to Jorgen Randers (2012a), the challenges China is facing 
are in principle not different from the development paths of other East Asian 
economies. We have still to see whether the "effects of scale" China has to 
deal with will play out as an advantage or a disadvantage to solving the global 
environmental crisis in the long run. 
Regardless of whether the reader is optimistic or pessimistic concerning 
the future of China's environment, I want to stress that there are untapped 
resources in bottom-up environmental initiatives from Chinese entrepreneurs 
and to-be entrepreneurs, the purposiveness of whose actions has constantly 
been underestimated by both the Chinese and the international community. 
Recent developments in philanthropy in China and the emergence of new 
organizational structures like Chinese foundations and private associations 
that invest their own money to contribute to a cleaner environment attest to 
this point. 
My central argument is that the best that society can do to nurture 
this process of is to do away with institutional arrange-
ments that were created for the purpose of profit maximization, so that 
more time and resources will be available for purpose-driven engagements 
linked to environmental conservation and protection. This thought links up 
to Elinor Ostrom's theory about Governing the Commons (1990), where 
she shows that self-organized institutional arrangements with community 
ownership are superior to both a top-down based government-led and an 
ordoliberal understanding of governance that focuses on property rights 
and free markets. Institutional economics and the Coase theorem taught 
us that all institutional have transaction costs. 
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is the crucial factor in results. And that is where 
self-organized solutions are stronger than other forms of institutional 
arrangements, namely in their ability to facilitate vertical and horizontal 
knowledge transfer, integrating available though scattered environmental 
knowledge and deploying the most appropriate technological equipment 
and management practices. 
The flow of information created human interaction cannot be substituted 
any institutional regulator in a way. if social respon-
is purpose-driven and motivated will it make a real dif-
ference. Purpose is something internal to the company and its managers, not 
something imposed from the outside. Therefore, I propose to move toward 
a more human-based outlook on CSR that focuses on the phenomenological 
accounts of the actors, and their purpose-driven entrepreneurial initiatives, 
instead of the performativity of interest-drivenness and profit maximization. 
As a closing note, I want to quote a Chinese entrepreneur in the environmen-
tal technology field, who pronounced an opinion which was echoed by many 
of my interviewees, "government action works in the beginning to edify a 
basic regulatory framework, but its effect is limited ... if we want to elicit 
positive change in the long run, it is the people and the entrepreneurs them-
selves who have to become aware of their environmental consciousness." 
NOTES 
1. Paying allegiance to the prominent Chinese principle of "seeking to establish a 
common ground while preserving differences" (qiutong cunyi) the Chinese govern-
ment has chosen the term "Ecological Civilization" as its umbrella term for what 
people know as "sustainable development" in the West. 
2. The most important of these "unequal treaties" were the treaties of Nanjing 1842 
and Humen 1843 with Great Britain; Wangxia 1844 with the United States; Wham-
poa 1844 with France; Aigun 1858 with Russia; Tianjin 1858 with Great Britain, the 
United States, France and Russia; and Shimonoseki 1895 with Japan. 
3. Whereas top-down refers to top-down action from the government, bottom-up 
implies an ordoliberalist understanding of CSR, where the state is the custodian of 
the law and Chinese companies are pressured by civil society, pollution victims and 
NGOs to adjust their behavior toward the socially and legally accepted norm. 
4. The different approaches to CSR in Table l are ideal-type like figurations but 
they are not intended to be mutually exclusive and monocausal. A problem with con-
ventional monocausal theories of change are that often there is one group perceived 
as the actor, whereas the other groups become agents. This agentization of people is 
convenient for prediction and formal analysis, as we can deploy a "ceteris paribus" 
assumptions. It is however also highly problematic as it does not fit the complexity 
and polycausality of the real world. An approach that is more suitable to complexity 
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and gives empirical evidence for the potential benefits of self-organization as opposed 
to top-down or ordoliberal approaches can be found in Elinor Ostrom's Governing the 
Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action ( 1990), which takes into 
account that any system is embedded in an institutional context, having a unique set of 
both advantages and transaction costs, that either both enable and restrict successful 
management of commonly-held resources. 
5. The difference between interest and purpose is that interest belongs more to the 
objective, external, quantifiable and observable domain, whereas purpose belongs to 
the subjective and hermeneutic realm, coming from inside of the individual. It makes 
sense to extend the definition of an entrepreneur beyond business ventures and to 
include political entrepreneurs, civil society entrepreneurs, etc. Being an entrepreneur 
as somebody who "transgresses" is therefore tied more to personal quality rather 
than the belonging to a predefined metier or social group and also transgresses profit-
seeking as the smallest common denominator, opening entrepreneurship to all kinds 
of purposively sense-making activities. 
6. It is reported that even though the Chinese Ministry of Environmental Protection 
(MEP) has increased its powers in recent years and may soon not be the toothless tiger 
it was described in Chai Jing's documentary, it still has rival competencies with other 
ministries like the Ministry of Water Resources (MWR), the Ministry of Industry and 
Information Technology (MIIT) and the National Development and Reform Commis-
sion (NDRC), among others. 
7. Nicaragua has until now no official diplomatic relations with the PRC (People's 
Republic of China), as it officially recognizes the ROC (Republic of China) on 
Taiwan. This, together with the high ecological risks that come associated with the 
construction of the Nicaragua canal, may explain why this project is preferably given 
to a private investor (at least officially), so as not to taint the government's reputation 
in case of a major environmental hiccup. 
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